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Major law schools are defined by the presence of major scholars, and
from time to time, scholars in a field become concentrated, creating an
intellectual movement identified with a particular place and time, such
as legal realism at Yale and Columbia in the 1920s and 1930s and law
and economics at Chicago from the 1970s on. Although not at a single
institution, in the 1980s and 1990s, the two ends of a stretch along
Interstate 90 marked such a time and place. At Northwestern University
School of Law, Ian Macneil built the magnificent intellectual edifice
of relational contract theory, and Richard Speidel, who once described
himself as a Midwesterner who naturally had “a mainstream orientation,”1
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Dick Speidel. Thanks to David Campbell and
Rick Swedloff for their comments.
1. Richard E. Speidel, Edward J. Murphy: The Man and the Casebook, 71 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 571, 572 (1996).

553

FEINMAN FINAL ARTICLE

10/1/2009 11:09 AM

glided easily between grand relational theory and practical application.2
Macneil and Speidel produced a series of works on relational contract in
theory and practice and collaborated with Thomas Stipanowich on what
may be the most underappreciated treatise in the history of American
legal scholarship.3 At the University of Wisconsin Law School at Madison,
Stewart Macaulay, John Kidwell, and William Whitford produced
pathbreaking works of empirical contracts scholarship that added further
grounding to the relational approach and a coursebook—casebook is not
the right name—that uniquely focused, as its title stated, on Contracts:
Law in Action.4
Just as legal realism fell out of vogue and ultimately became inculcated in
legal culture as a set of insights so watered down from their original
strength as to seem banal, so too is relational contract theory no longer
the talk of the town among contracts scholars. I use the occasion of this
symposium dedicated to the memory of Dick Speidel to bring renewed
attention to relational contract theory, to suggest a dimension of it that
has been understated in the literature, and to illustrate its application to a
particular doctrinal problem in insurance law. That problem is the standard
to be applied to evaluate the behavior of insurance companies in firstparty bad faith cases—cases in which a policyholder alleges that the
insurance company, its contracting partner, has violated the duty of good
faith and fair dealing that is present in every contract and intensified in
insurance contracts.
I. RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
A. A Summary of Relational Contract Theory
Relational contract theory contains an anthropological account of
human interaction. It begins with the “primal roots of contract” and
yields a theory that is remarkably broad in scope.5 The core is exchange,
which includes any social interaction in which reciprocity is a major
element. Contract is narrower but not much narrower, including any

2. The addition in 1987 of a young Ian Ayres added further luster to Northwestern’s
contract faculty.
3. 1–5 IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT (1999).
4. 1 STEWART MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS:
LAW IN ACTION, at iii (2d ed. LexisNexis 2003) (1995).
5. Macneil identifies the primal roots of contract as society, specialization of labor and
exchange, choice, and awareness of future. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:
AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 1–4 (1980). See also Jay M.
Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 741 (2000).
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interaction “in which economic exchange is a significant factor.”6 The
anthropology reveals that contract occurs along a spectrum. At one end
is the discrete exchange, the isolated, narrowly focused, wealth-maximizing
exchange that is the paradigm of neoclassical economics and of classical
contract law. At the other end is the relational contract, extending over
time, involving a range of performance elements and personal relationships,
and ill-suited to complete planning at the moment of its formation. In
between are transactions having discrete and relational characteristics
and taking an infinite variety of forms. Although the discrete transaction
was long the model for understanding the social institution known as the
market and the body of contract law that enabled and regulated it, in
fact, exchange relations are far more common than discrete exchanges.
Indeed, the discrete exchange is little more than an intellectual construct
because even the most discrete exchange is situated within a framework
of relations that help define, support, and bound it.7
This descriptive component of relational contract theory leads directly
into its normative component. Exchange as a social process gives rise to
norms, “[A] case of an ‘is’ creating an ‘ought.’”8 Macneil identified ten
common contract norms that are immanent in the institution of exchange
itself; these include such norms as role integrity, reciprocity, the
implementation of planning, and propriety of means.9 Some of these
norms are intensified by discrete and relational exchanges, respectively.
For example, the narrowly focused and well-defined nature of discrete
exchanges causes the norms of implementation of planning and effectuation
of consent to be given greater emphasis.10 The breadth and openness of
relational exchanges, on the other hand, give greater importance to
maintaining the integrity of one’s role within the relation and to
harmonizing the relation with the surrounding social matrix.11

6. IAN R. MACNEIL & PAUL
AND RELATIONS, at v (3d ed. 2001).

J. GUDEL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS

7. See David Campbell, The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract, in
CONTRACT AND ECONOMIC ORGANISATION 40 (David Campbell & Peter Vincent-Jones
eds., 1996).
8. Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors
Lindenberg and de Vos, 143 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 272, 274 (1987).
9. MACNEIL, supra note 5, at 36–59.
10. Id. at 59–64.
11. Id. at 64–70; Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U.
L. REV. 340, 364–66 (1983).
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The contract norms are not expressed in the parties’ agreement but are
a source of obligation nonetheless. Indeed, for Macneil, these immanent
norms yield “more precise, intellectually coherent principles which are
nevertheless sufficiently open-textured for effective use in the law of
modern contractual relations.”12
Although the norms are abstract and general, their use in the law is
not. A necessary step in the translation of relational principles into legal
principles is to contextualize them. This contextualization both places
particular contracts or kinds of contracts along the relational-discrete
continuum and focuses on functional categories, such as long-term
relationships involving sophisticated commercial parties and insurance
contracts involving consumers, the subject matter of this Article. The
contract norms are also supplemented by norms that are external to the
relation, including norms derived from the setting in which the relation
is situated, such as “reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing”13
in the trade and general social values, such as controls on the abuse of
power.
One source of relational contract theory’s power is that it is both
general and contextual. It treats exchange at the most general level and
it contextualizes to examine specific types of relations. Within that
contextualization, one might identify emphasis on two strains of contracts at
the relational end of the continuum. One strain focuses on the long-term
contract between sophisticated commercial parties of relative equality.
This strain emphasizes the limited nature of the initial planning of the
relation and the need for ongoing cooperation and accommodation as the
relation extends through time. The other strain focuses on relations that
are more often characterized by dependence and inequality, of which
employment and family relations are prominent examples.
B. The Insurance Relation as Relational Contract
The relationship between an insurance company and its consumer
policyholder is perhaps the best example of a relational contract of
dependence and inequality.14 The insurance contract is a relational
contract par excellence. The relation created by the contract extends
over time; although a typical policy term is a year, the rate of renewal is
very high, often in the order of ninety percent, so a typical relation
12. Ian R. Macneil, Reflections on Relational Contract, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 541, 545 (1985).
13. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(j) (2008).
14. Insurance policies issued to sophisticated commercial entities bear some but not all
of the same characteristics as policies issued to consumers. The discussion in this Article
addresses only the latter type of policy.
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extends over years or even decades. The insurance contract is distinctive
because, as a contract that transfers risk, performance may never be
required if the risk insured against never comes to pass. If the risk does occur,
however, cooperation and performance in ways not specified in the
contract are required, particularly on the part of the company; the
company’s duty of prompt payment and performance in good faith are
seldom defined in the policy and are only fully realized in the surrounding
norms of practice and law. The relation is also situated in a context of
social relationships; the single insurance contract is an instance of a
system of insurance on which policyholders, dependents, tort victims,
and society at large depend to provide security in the event of harm.
Therefore, the insurance contract is clearly a relational contract. As
with any other class of relational contracts encompassing a large number
of specific examples, it can be described in a number of ways. As
relevant to the issue of the first-party bad faith standard, a few different
elements of the insurance relationship bear emphasis. The first is about
the insurance policy, the formal legal contract that creates the relationship.
The second is about the nature of performances under the policy. The
third is about the representation of the relationship by the company and
the understanding by the policyholder created by that representation.
The insurance policy is a classic contract of adhesion. It is a standard
form contract drafted by the dominant party, the insurance company, and
adhered to by the subordinate party, the policyholder;15 the dominant
party enters into many such transactions and the insured enters into few.
The document typically is not read by the insured and, in significant
part, is not likely to be understood if it is read; the insurance policy is an
extreme example of the “agreement now, terms later” form contract
because the entire policy is never presented at the time the insured first
purchases it. The terms are not subject to negotiation; the insured may
be offered varying policy limits, riders, and amendments, but those are
also adhesion alternatives that do not dramatically expand the range of
choices available.
The insurance policy is a complex document. Even though personal
lines insurance policies are now typically drafted in plain language, plain
does not equate with short or simple. The policy most commonly
15. Insurance policies are often promulgated by the Insurance Services Office (ISO)—
a national insurance industry trade group—and approved by state regulators. But for all
practical purposes, the ISO is the voice of the insurance companies and state regulation of
policy terms is seldom meaningful.
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purchased by homeowners, the HO-3 policy produced by the ISO,
contains: three pages of declarations; two pages of general definitions,
not counting definitions stated elsewhere in the policy; six pages
describing what property is covered; three pages stating what risks are
covered; two pages describing what risks are excluded from coverage,
not counting exclusions stated elsewhere in the policy; three pages of
conditions on the property coverage; and seven pages describing the
liability coverage, including more statements of risk, exclusions, and
conditions. And that is only the basic policy; attachments might include
limited earthquake coverage, workers compensation for residence
employees, oil tank coverage, and other special provisions.16
From the company’s perspective, the policy plans in detail the terms
of the relationship, specifying the risks covered and excluded and the
duties of the company and the insured in the event of loss. The policy,
in the jargon of relational contract theory, “presentiates” the relationship
at the moment of formation by projecting all elements of performance
and risk from the future into the present and at that moment defining the
performance and risk terms that govern the relationship.17 From the
insured’s perspective, the policy is at best a modest exercise in planning,
specifying a few important items such as policy limits. This conflict of
perceptions suggests that the company views the policy as having more
discrete elements because the norms of implementation of planning and
effectuation of consent are intensified. The insured is likely to have a
different perspective. The details of the insurance policy become important
to the insured only at the point of loss. At that point, because of the
limitations and exclusions from coverage of which the insured was not
previously aware, the policy becomes a device by which the company is
able to avoid responsibility.
This conflict is exacerbated because, unlike many relational contracts,
in which both parties perform over an extended period of time, performance
under an insurance policy is always sequential. The insured’s essential
performance is to pay the premium, which it does at the time of formation.
The company’s essential performance is to relieve the insured of the burden
of a loss, a performance that is only required later, if at all. This creates
for the company the ability to act opportunistically. When a loss occurs,
it is in the company’s interest not to pay a claim or to pay as little as
possible; there is a zero-sum game in play by which every dollar the

16. A copy of the policy is available on the Insurance Information Institute website.
Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., Homeowners 3—Special Form, http://server.iii.org/yy_obj_data/
binary/748905_1_0/HO3_sample.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2009).
17. Ian R. Macneil, Commentary, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation,
60 VA. L. REV. 589, 589 (1974).
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company does not pay the insured becomes a dollar of profit for the
company. At the time of loss, the insured has few means of compelling
the company’s performance. Unlike many other contracts, because the
performances are sequential, the insured cannot withhold its own
performance to give the company an incentive to pay because that
performance, the payment of the premium, has already occurred. Also,
unlike many other contracts, once the loss has occurred, the insured
cannot procure a substitute performance through another contract; a
buyer whose seller breaches the duty to deliver contracted goods can
measure its damages by the difference between the contract price and the
market price or the cover price, but the insured cannot purchase alternative
insurance against a risk that has already come to pass. The policy terms
and the surrounding law that measure the company’s performance,
including the law of bad faith, are vague and therefore difficult to
enforce, especially compared to the terms measuring the insured’s
performance—the insured either does or does not pay the premium on
time, but whether the company has failed to pay in good faith is much
harder to determine.
The conflict between the company and the policyholder arises in large
part because of the representation of the relationship by the company
and the understanding by the policyholder created by that representation.
The typical insured understands the insurance relationship to be one in
which the company promises security and protection, rather than a
detailed and obscure set of specifications and exclusions of coverage.
This understanding is fostered by the presentation of the relationship by
insurance companies themselves through extensive advertising. Many
of the iconic slogans of American marketing portray insurance as a place
of security and refuge from the dangers of the world: “Like a good neighbor,
State Farm is there” and “You’re in good hands with Allstate.” More
recently, Liberty Mutual’s slogan: “Responsibility. What’s your policy?”
II. FIRST-PARTY BAD FAITH AND THE FAIRLY DEBATABLE RULE
Speidel commented about the prospect that relational contract theory
has to inform doctrinal questions:
The combination of a broader, more complex descriptive theory with the potential
for the relationship itself to generate internal norms that become part of the obligations
of the parties both distinguishes relational theory from modern contract law and
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provides a challenge to courts which are petitioned to resolve relational contract
disputes.18

This description of essential elements of the insurance contract as
relational contract provides a basis for examining the doctrinal focus of
this Article, the standard applied in first-party bad faith cases.19
Bad faith can arise in two contexts in insurance cases. In third-party
cases involving liability insurance, the company acts in bad faith when it
breaches its duty to defend or settle litigation against its policyholder. In
a typical case, the company rejects an offer to settle the case against its
insured within policy limits, exposing the insured to a judgment in
excess of those limits. In first-party cases, the company acts in bad faith
when it fails to properly pay a claim for coverage by the policyholder.
The law of bad faith aims to fully compensate the policyholder for its
losses when the insurance company in bad faith fails to keep its promise
to indemnify and, in third-party cases, to defend. Simply awarding the
policyholder the amount it was due under the policy would not compensate
for the delay and expense of obtaining the payment, such as attorneys’
fees and other costs and, in appropriate cases, emotional distress. In
third-party cases, the compensation includes the amount of the excess
judgment for which the policyholder is liable, an excess amount that
resulted from the company’s bad faith failure to settle. Bad faith law
also aims to check the insurance company’s temptation to behave
opportunistically; by delaying or denying payment to the policyholder,
the company increases its own profits at the expense of its policyholder.
In third-party cases involving liability insurance, nearly every jurisdiction
allows an action either in tort or contract or under a fair claims practices
statute by a policyholder against its insurer for breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing inherent in every contract. In a typical case,
the insurer breaches its obligation to give adequate consideration to the
insured’s interest by failing to exercise good faith in settling a case by a
tort victim against the policyholder, exposing the policyholder to the
possibility of an excess judgment.
A much smaller number—about half of the jurisdictions—permit an
action by the policyholder against a first-party insurer for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.20 Among these jurisdictions,
18. Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 823, 827 (2000).
19. The discussion here is about the standard to be applied to evaluate the insurer’s
good faith, assuming that the jurisdiction allows the action at all. Although the relational
analysis that leads to a rejection of the fairly debatable standard also suggests something
about whether there should be a cause of action at all, I do not address that directly.
20. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
183–84 (4th ed. 2007).
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courts describe the content of the good faith duty in a variety of ways,
but most require something more than a negligent failure to investigate
or pay a claim, adopting instead the fairly debatable standard.21 Perhaps
the most widely cited formulation of the standard comes from the Wisconsin
Supreme Court’s decision in Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co.:
To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff must show the absence of a reasonable
basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless
disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim. It is apparent,
then, that the tort of bad faith is an intentional one. “Bad faith” by definition
cannot be unintentional.22

The court further explained:
The tort of bad faith can be alleged only if the facts pleaded would, on the
basis of an objective standard, show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying
the claim, i.e., would a reasonable insurer under the circumstances have denied
or delayed payment of the claim under the facts and circumstances.
....
Under these tests of the tort of bad faith, an insurance company, however, may
challenge claims which are fairly debatable and will be found liable only where it
has intentionally denied (or failed to process or pay) a claim without a reasonable
basis.23

Note that calling this the fairly debatable test is something of a misnomer
because it is not strictly speaking one that measures good faith solely by
whether the underlying claim was fairly debatable. Because the court
characterizes bad faith as an intentional tort, it requires the insured to
show both that the underlying claim was not fairly debatable and also
that the company knew that it was not fairly debatable or acted
recklessly with respect to that issue.
Later courts created a procedural elaboration on the fairly debatable
test. “Under the ‘fairly debatable’ standard, a claimant who could not
have established as a matter of law a right to summary judgment on the
substantive claim would not be entitled to assert a claim for an insurer’s
bad-faith refusal to pay the claim.”24 The summary judgment elaboration
was both the logical consequence of the requirement that an action for
bad faith would lie “only if the facts pleaded would, on the basis of an
objective standard, show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 186.
271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978).
Id. at 377.
Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 454 (N.J. 1993).
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the claim,”25 and it was grounded in policy:
“[W]hen a claim is ‘fairly debatable,’ the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the
debate concerns a matter of fact or law.” The rationale for this legal principle is
based upon the potential in terrorem effect of “bad faith” litigation upon the insurer.
“‘An insurer should have the right to litigate a claim when it feels there is a question
of law or fact which needs to be decided before it in good faith is required to pay the
claimant.’”26

III. THE FAIRLY DEBATABLE RULE AND THE RELATIONAL APPROACH
The fairly debatable rule and the summary judgment elaboration of the
rule is the strong majority rule among jurisdictions that permit a cause of
action for bad faith in first-party cases. From the perspective of relational
contract theory, however, it is deeply flawed.
Begin with the contrast between the account of the insurance
relationship implicit in the fairly debatable rule and the description of
that relation derived from the application of relational theory. The rule
is based on a perception that the policy terms are the predominant
feature defining the relationship.
The policy defines the scope of the insurer’s liability; as companies
often say, their duty is to pay what is owed according to the policy, no
less but no more. In a coverage dispute, therefore, the insurer is permitted
to dispute any issue as long as that issue is fairly debatable. The summary
judgment elaboration of the rule follows from this posture; if there are
material facts or legal issues in dispute—if the insured cannot obtain
summary judgment in the coverage action—then it is not bad faith for the
company to contest the action. Indeed, the company is practically required
to do so. If the company were to pay a claim when there was a reasonable
basis for disputing it, the cost of the claim would be unfairly imposed on
other insureds through an increase in premium costs. Only when the
company not only lacks a reasonable basis for disputing the claim under
the policy terms, but when it also knows or recklessly disregards the
unreasonableness of that basis, is it acting in bad faith.
The policy seldom contains explicit terms about the claim administration.
Instead, the company is bound only by a general provision requiring it to
adjust the claim and by an implicit policy term, the obligation of good
faith. In these cases, too, the standard imposed by the fairly debatable
rule is absence of a reasonable basis for the action and knowledge or
reckless disregard of that absence. To act in bad faith is not merely to
breach or to breach through negligence, but to act with an element of
25. Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 377.
26. Polizzi Meats, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 931 F. Supp. 328, 334–35 (D.N.J.
1996) (citation omitted) (quoting Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376, 377).
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willfulness, or at least recklessness, to subvert the ends of the deal. If
the company unreasonably delays payment of a claim, fails to investigate,
or denies payment, it has simply exercised its rights under the policy as
long as it does not act with knowing or reckless disregard of its obligations.
In short, implicit in the fairly debatable rule is an assumption that the
insurance company and the policyholder are adverse; the insured has
only the rights clearly defined in the contract, and the company is
entitled to vigorously protect its own interests in investigation and
application of the contract provisions. From the relational perspective,
this focus on the terms of the policy, express or implied, incorrectly
characterizes the insurance relationship.
As a descriptive matter, this focus situates the insurance contract too
far at the discrete end of the discrete-relational spectrum. It assumes that
the policy represents a considered exercise in planning by the parties that
deserves to be implemented throughout the relation. In fact, because the
insurance relation is a relation of dependence and inequality rather than
one of bargaining between parties of equal sophistication and leverage, it
is incorrect to focus on the terms of the policy as fully constituting the
relationship. Looking through a relational lens at the way insurance
policies are drafted through industry collaboration, framed to limit the
rights of policyholders, redrafted as necessary to account for negative
court decisions, and imposed on policyholders who will not read or
understand them suggests that the policy terms are an uncertain guide to
the content of the relation. In areas other than bad faith, insurance law
recognizes this reality, interpreting ambiguities against the company,
reading grants of coverage broadly and exclusions narrowly, and honoring
reasonable expectations, among other things.
The focus on policy terms misconceives the relation in another way.
The perception that the core of what the insurance company is selling
and the policyholder is buying is the detailed terms specified in the
policy is at odds with the representation and understanding of the relation
as providing protection against risk through a promise of security by a
trustworthy partner. Such a partner—a good neighbor, a responsible company,
someone who keeps you in good hands—does not niggle about terms,
looking for any reasonable basis to deny coverage, being negligent or
inattentive to its dependent partner’s needs.
This point is reinforced by the normative analysis of relational contract
theory. Relational contract theory moves from description to prescription
through its identification of the norms immanent in exchange relations
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and in the larger society. Here, I will illustrate by using only one part of
Macneil’s elaborate structure of the common contract norms, role
integrity, which takes on enhanced importance in relations.
In relational contracts such as insurance, roles have not only “an
element of individual utility enhancement” but also have “intricate
interlinkings of habits, custom, internal rules, social exchange, expectations
respecting the future, and the like.”27 The insurance company’s role
illustrates this complexity. Although the company’s role includes writing
policies, investing premiums, and paying claims in order to make a
profit, its role also includes securing the future of the policyholder in the
event of loss. This is true not only of the company but also of its
employees; adjusters, for example, are trained to be empathetic and
supportive, and industry standards and law demand that they be
responsive, careful, and protective of the policyholder’s interest. As
such, it is a violation of the company’s and the adjuster’s role integrity to
act in its own interest at the expense of the policyholder unless it has a
clear basis for doing so.
Macneil recognizes that roles are conflictual in this way and suggests
that this conflict can be “a perfectly good basis for normative behavior.”28
One must balance the short-term interest in maximizing profits against
the long-term interest in the company’s and the insurance industry’s
well-being. The history of insurance is replete with examples in which
opportunism is maximizing in the short-term for a single company but so
destructive of public trust in the long-term that it is detrimental to the
interest of all companies—an example of Nobel Prize-winning economist
George Akerlof’s proposition that lemons drive out peaches.29 Policyholders
expect every company “to approximate the product of similar tensions”
among all companies;30 the insurance industry’s portrayal of itself is of
security and fairness in the claims process, a portrayal that would be
violated by denying claims simply because they are fairly debatable.
This conflict is reflected in the differences between neoclassical and
relational approaches to contract law and, in turn, by the different
approaches of the fairly debatable rule and the relational approach.
27. MACNEIL, supra note 5, at 65.
28. Id. at 43.
29. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970). For example, policy provisions and
statutes making life insurance policies incontestable after a period of coverage had passed
arose because insurance companies frequently used innocent errors by policyholders in their
applications for life insurance as an after-the-fact basis for avoiding payment on policies.
This practice threatened the saleability of life insurance. See Richard E. Stewart & Barbara D.
Stewart, The Loss of the Certainty Effect, 4 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 29, 41 (2001); Eric K.
Fosaaen, Note, AIDS and the Incontestability Clause, 66 N.D. L. REV. 267, 268–69 (1990).
30. MACNEIL, supra note 5, at 43.
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Neoclassical law assumes a core of self-interest affected at the periphery
by custom and regulation. From that view, the insurance company is
free to act in its interest and so to maximize its profits except to the
extent that it is limited by terms of the policy or regulatory restrictions.
Relational contract law assumes a baseline of obligation in which selfinterest and other-regardingness are intertwined. Insurance law already
has adopted at least some relational insights, with some courts regarding
insurance contracts as sufficiently different from ordinary commercial
contracts in that they demand an enhanced obligation of good faith.31
A test for this view of the role is to ask how the participants in the
contract would regard the fairly debatable rule.32 The rule states that the
company may resolve doubts in its own favor rather than that of the
insured and may act carelessly in investigating a claim, determining
coverage, and deciding whether and when to pay. Would the insurance
company be willing to advertise its policies on that basis, and would a
prospective policyholder buy a policy from such a company? Would a
company include a policy provision that rendered it immune from
liability for bad faith, and therefore not subject to consequential damages
in the event of a negligent coverage decision or an improper claims
practice unless it acted with the intent to harm the policyholder’s interests or
acted in reckless disregard of them, and would a knowledgeable policyholder
accept such a provision? None of these are likely because the relation of
insurance is about security, and the hypothetical advertisement and
provision are inconsistent with the perceptions of the relation.
The relational approach also highlights another aspect of the insurance
relation that the fairly debatable rule ignores or understates: the nature of
the insurance contract as one of sequential performance that creates the
potential for opportunism by the insurer. If one assumption underlying
the fairly debatable rule is that the policy terms are the touchstone of
obligation, a second assumption underlying the rule is that the typical
insurance company ordinarily fulfills the terms of the policy voluntarily
and in good faith. Because the company routinely acts properly, it needs

31. A classic example of the limitation of the enhanced duty of good faith to insurance
contracts is the rise and fall of bad faith in California law. See Freeman & Mills, Inc. v.
Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 671–80 (Cal. 1995); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373, 389–402 (Cal. 1988) (en banc).
32. Indeed, this is a more expansive version of the hypothetical contract approach
propounded by law-and-economics scholars and judges that attempts to construct the maximally
efficient terms to which parties would have agreed.
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to be sanctioned only in the unusual case in which it departs significantly
from normal behavior by acting with malice or with reckless disregard
for the policyholder’s rights under the policy. The relational approach focuses
attention on the problem of opportunism in general and on its specific
manifestations in the claim process. That different focus demonstrates
further deficiencies with the fairly debatable rule.
Most of the focus on opportunism in the insurance literature is about
policyholder opportunism, manifested in moral hazard or adverse selection.33
But there has long been a significant problem with insurer opportunism.
Historically, this was often manifested through the behavior that became
known as “post-claim underwriting.”34 When a claim was presented, a
company would seize on errors by the insured in the application to deny
coverage.35 The courts and legislatures recognized this and responded in
various ways, such as through doctrines of waiver, estoppel, incontestability,
and materiality of misrepresentation.36 Today, the greater problem is
opportunism in the claims process.
As a matter of theory, the attraction to the insurance company in
behaving opportunistically is obvious. The company that denies payment
of a claim in whole or part increases its profits. The company that only
delays payment of a claim increases its investment income and thereby
increases its profit. Bad faith law aims to deter this behavior. As a
federal court in New Jersey said, “Recognition of an action permitting an
insured to recover damages in excess of the actual amount owed under the
contract would provide an effective means of countering the existing
incentives for an insurance company to wrongfully delay or deny payment.”37
Behaving opportunistically by delaying or denying payment of rightful
claims is attractive in part because, outside of bad faith litigation, there
are insufficient controls on or deterrents to opportunism. Market discipline
is largely absent because prospective policyholders have no access to
useful and reliable information about claims practices, and insurance
companies rarely advertise their claim-paying attributes in meaningful
ways. Regulators have been largely absent in this area as well. Although
some state regulators have begun to collect claim practices information and
report it through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
the information is not available to the public. Aside from the occasional,
exceptionally searching market conduct examination, regulators have not
systematically addressed claim practices abuses. The few high visibility
33. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 4–5 (2d ed. 2008).
34. See Thomas C. Cady & Georgia Lee Gates, Post Claim Underwriting, 102 W.
VA. L. REV. 809, 810 (2000).
35. Id. at 812–13.
36. Id. at 838–54.
37. DiSalvatore v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 624 F. Supp. 541, 543 (D.N.J. 1986).
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exceptions—the response to insurance practices after Hurricane Katrina
is the most notable—are the exceptions that prove the rule.
Beyond theory, although the insurance industry obviously disputes the
charge, there is substantial evidence that since the early 1990s, insurance
companies have increasingly viewed the claims process not as the site
for keeping their promise of security but as a profit center.38 Through
systematic reorganization of the claims process, incentives to employees
and managers, and more aggressive approaches to litigation, the companies
have embarked on a strategy that increases profits at the expense of
claimants. This development has taken place across property, casualty, and
disability insurances as a whole. The relational approach reminds us to
focus on context at increasingly finer levels, and that focus reveals
several particular areas in which opportunism has become a major
feature of the claims landscape.
One class of cases involves auto accidents with low-speed impact in
which the victim suffers injuries that manifest as sprains and strains
rather than fractures or injuries easily visible on X-rays or other diagnostic
tests. These are known as Minor Impact Soft Tissue (MIST) claims and
are sometimes derided by the insurance industry as whiplash claims.39
Insurance companies have focused on these as an area in which an
aggressive posture tends to discourage claimants and therefore reduce
claims payouts.40 Because relatively smaller amounts of damages are at
stake, an aggressive defense posture makes it less profitable for an
attorney to represent a victim on a contingency fee basis, so victims may
not be able to press their claims.41
Because MIST claims are often the subject of systematic insurer
opportunism, they present an area in which courts should be particularly
watchful in policing behavior. But the fairly debatable test goes in just
the opposite direction. Insurance companies have amassed an army of
experts in biomechanics, accident reconstruction, and neck and back
injuries to refute claims in MIST cases, typically by finding that the
38. This development is the topic of my forthcoming book, JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY,
DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN
DO ABOUT IT (forthcoming 2010). See also Jay M. Feinman, Incentives for Litigation or
Settlement in Large Tort Cases: Responding to Insurance Company Intransigence, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 189, 193–97 (2008).
39. See 1 KAREN K. KOEHLER & MICHAEL D. FREEMAN, LITIGATING MINOR IMPACT
SOFT TISSUE CASES §§ 1:1, 3:1 (2008), available at 1 LMISTC s 1:1, 3:1 (Westlaw).
40. Id. §§ 1:3, 5:1, available at 1 LMISTC s 1:3, 5:1 (Westlaw).
41. 1A id. § 38:3, available at 1A LMISTC s 38:3 (Westlaw).
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injuries suffered could not have been incurred in an accident of this type
or that the victims’ injuries are transitory or the product of malingering
or outright fakery.42 If the insurance company can produce some of this
evidence, it raises an issue of fact that prevents summary judgment and
thus the bad faith claim fails the fairly debatable test. Therefore, for
example, when an insurance company can obtain a report of a so-called
independent medical examination of the policyholder by a doctor
retained by the insurance company—perhaps routinely retained by the
insurance company—that is enough to make the claim fairly debatable.43
A second class of cases involving opportunism includes those cases in
which the company raises the specter of insurance fraud. Companies
have integrated fraud allegations into the claim process, routinely using
referrals to their Special Investigation Units (SIUs) and suspicions of
fraud to delay or deny payment. These suspicions carry weight because
the insurance industry has been dramatically successful in its campaign
to raise fears of an epidemic of insurance fraud. In the minds of the public,
enforcement agencies, claimants, and judges, the public campaign makes
more credible the suspicions in individual claims cases. Allegations of
fraud, perhaps supported by inferences rather than actual evidence, even
when met by an overwhelming amount of evidence to the contrary, are
enough to make the insurance company’s decision to deny a claim seem
reasonable and thus fairly debatable. Where, for example, the company’s
allegations of arson by the policyholder are supported by a few pieces of
evidence even though the bulk of the evidence exonerates the insured,
the claim is fairly debatable.44
The difficulties with the fairly debatable rule from the relational
perspective are made worse when it is framed in terms that allow the
insured to establish bad faith only if it would have won a motion for
summary judgment on the coverage claim. The summary judgment
standard states that an insured is entitled to summary judgment “if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”45 The key to
summary judgment is whether a factual dispute exists. As long as there
is a triable issue of fact, summary judgment must be denied. The court
denies summary judgment unless a reasonable fact finder viewing the

42. 1 id. §§ 7:1, 21:1, available at 1 LMISTC s 7:1, 21:1 (Westlaw).
43. See, e.g., Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, ¶ 35, 56 P.3d 524.
44. See Polizzi Meats, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 931 F. Supp. 328, 331–32,
335 (D.N.J. 1996).
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
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evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion
would be compelled to find for the moving party.
As is well known, this is a difficult standard to meet. As a California
court emphasized:
Because a summary judgment denies the adversary party a trial, it should be
granted with caution. Declarations of the moving party are strictly construed, those
of the opposing party are liberally construed, and doubts as to whether a summary
judgment should be granted must be resolved in favor of the opposing party. The
court focuses on issue finding; it does not resolve issues of fact. The court seeks
to find contradictions in the evidence, or inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence, which raise a triable issue of material fact.46

In a bad faith case using a summary judgment standard under the fairly
debatable rule, all the insurer must do is present evidence that raises a
factual dispute or persuade the court that the evidence in favor of the
insured is not unquestionable or does not conclusively establish coverage.
In a MIST case, that burden can be met by the presentation of expert
testimony challenging causation or the extent of injuries, evidence that is
standardized and routinely available. In a fraud case, that burden can be
met by having an SIU investigator raise some doubts about benefit or
opportunity or identify some suspicious facts about the cause of the risk.
In both cases, the relational understanding of security and the need to
prevent opportunism is undermined by application of the standard.
IV. A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD FOR FIRST-PARTY BAD FAITH CASES
The fairly debatable rule and particularly the summary judgment
elaboration on the rule misunderstand the nature of the insurance
relationship and the contexts in which insurance claims are presented.
The rule permits the insurance company to act unreasonably during the
claim process. It even permits the company to intentionally injure the
insured’s interest or to act with reckless disregard for the insured’s
interest as long as there is some evidence that it has acted at the worst
negligently, that is, that it can avoid summary judgment on the issue of
intent.
The perspective that relational contract theory provides on the insurance
relation suggests a different rule. A few jurisdictions use such an alternative
rule that is more attuned to the relationship and its contexts as seen
46. Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312, 318 (Ct. App. 2007) (citation
omitted).
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through the lens of relational contract theory.47 That rule renders a
company liable for bad faith if it is negligent in failing to pay a claim
without also requiring that the company have acted with intent or
recklessness.
From the relational perspective, negligence is a better rule because it
recognizes that the terms of the policy are the starting point for analysis
of the insurance relationship but, because of the relational character, the
policy insufficiently defines the terms of that relationship. That relationship,
as represented by the company, is one of security, in which the company
has adopted a role of acting not as an adverse party to its insured but in a
responsible manner to give the insured the benefits it reasonably expects.
The rule also recognizes the possibility of insurer opportunism in the area
of claim practices, and the heightened possibility in particular classes of
cases, such as MIST claims and fraud allegations. Such a rule serves the
broader social role of the insurance relation in providing indemnity and
security for large numbers of people at the time it is most needed—when
substantial risks come to pass.
The negligence rule is consistent with widely accepted standards in the
insurance industry and the law for the company’s reasonable behavior in
the claim process. For example, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners’ Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act states
that the company must “effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlement
of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear.”48
To do this, the company also is required by the statute to “adopt and
implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and settlement
of claims arising under its policies.”49 In its investigation, the company
must be objective, discovering and evaluating facts that support the
claim and not just facts that give it a basis for turning down the claim.
The company may not “[c]ompel[ ] insureds or beneficiaries to institute
suits to recover amounts due under its policies by offering substantially
less than the amounts ultimately recovered in suits brought by them.”50
The question raised in first-party bad faith is how closely a company
must hew to these standards before it violates the norms of the insurance
relation and acts in bad faith. The fairly debatable rule and the summary
judgment elaboration state that as long as a company does not intentionally
or recklessly violate the standards, it has not acted in bad faith. Moreover,
47. STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 5:02 (1997),
identifies eight jurisdictions that adopt this rule, following the California Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). Reading the
cases that he cites suggest this may overstate the number.
48. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4(D) (1997).
49. Id. § 4(C).
50. Id. § 4(E).
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the determination of intent or recklessness will be made through a process
that favors the company and disfavors the insured because, unless the insured
can demonstrate indisputably that the claim was not fairly debatable, bad
faith is not present.
From the relational perspective, this fails to embody the norms of the
insurance relation. The norms require more. Providing security and
avoiding opportunism are not well-served by a company that is careless
even if it does not intentionally injure its insured or act with disregard
for its interests. It is too much to expect an insurance company to get
every claim right, to investigate correctly, or to give all of the benefit of
the doubt to the insured. What is expected, however, is that the company
act reasonably.
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